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On December 17, 1919, Young India, a weekly English-language periodical 
published in Ahmedabad, India and inaugurated and edited by Mohandas K. 
Gandhi, printed a fastidious and pointed critique of British imperialism. Entitled 
Indians Abroad and written by Gandhi, the essay was both a condemnation of the 
cruelty and neglect that confronted British Indians who traveled and settled 
outside the subcontinent and an affirmation of their many contributions to the 
British Empire, including their forced labor.1 Gandhi’s focus was not the white 
settlement colonies of Australia, New Zealand, or Canada where restrictive 
immigration policies barring the entry of British-Indian subjects had garnered 
significant attention and commentary throughout India and the Indian diaspora.2 
Rather, his essay was motivated by a similar and growing discontent in Fiji, and 
 
* Renisa Mawani is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of British 
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especially Brenna Bhandar, Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Ariela Gross, Thomas Kemple, Michelle 
McKinley, Justin Richland, Brook Thomas, Chris Tomlins, and Mariana Valverde. Many thanks also 
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1. 19 MAHATMA GANDHI, Indians Abroad, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA 
GANDHI 185, 185–87 (4th rev. ed. 2000). 
2. Prohibitions on British Indian migration had generated considerable criticism amongst 
British Indians in India, Canada, Australia, and especially South Africa. For a discussion of these 
prohibitions in the settler colonies see MARILYN LAKE & HENRY REYNOLDS, DRAWING THE 
GLOBAL COLOUR LINE: WHITE MEN’S COUNTRIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE OF 
RACIAL EQUALITY 186–87 (2008). See generally ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK, RACISM AND EMPIRE: 
WHITE SETTLERS AND COLORED IMMIGRANTS IN THE BRITISH SELF-GOVERNING COLONIES 
1830–1910 (1976).  
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East and South Africa, its effects equally manifest in proposals to legally restrict 
and prohibit Indian migration and settlement. In settler colonies, Indians were 
perceived as threats to white labor and thus to white futures. In Kenya, Gandhi 
noted, quoting a telegram he received from Nairobi, Europeans alleged that 
“Africans morally deteriorate through Indian contact but advance under Christian 
Western civilization.”3 These assertions, his correspondent explained, were issued 
by local European associations and were aimed at fortifying Indian exclusion. 
Responding to these objections and rendering them grossly inaccurate, Gandhi 
reminded his readers that the Indian “penetrated East Africa when there was no 
European there and affected for the better [the] manners and customs of the 
[African] people.”4 “Those who prate about the Christian civilization,” he 
admonished, “ignore the teaching of history” and “know nothing of the manner in 
which the Indian settler has raised the native of Africa.”5 
In Gandhi’s account, the sojourn and settlement of British Indians in East 
and South Africa stood in stark contrast to the questionable objectives and 
destructive effects of European expansion, including territorial appropriation and 
racial-colonial violence. Unlike Europeans, Indians did not “force their customs 
upon the Africans.”6 “[N]or did they take the brandy bottle in the one hand and 
the gun in the other . . . .”7 They “did not go to East Africa with the intention of 
‘civilizing’ the barbarians,” he maintained.8 Rather, Indians sought permission to 
enter Africa, traded with “the natives of the soil,” and left “traces of their 
civilization” therein.9 Drawing a clear and infallible distinction between the 
interests and intentions of Indian traders and those of British and European 
colonists, particularly their opposing ethical positions, Gandhi described both to 
be “settlers,” albeit on different terms. In East Africa, he insisted, the European 
could not possibly claim to be a “pioneer settler.” The Indian was the “pioneer.” 
The economic development of the region, he urged, was the result of Indian labor. 
British Indians “worked in the midst of grave danger to health,” cultivated and 
developed the land, and contributed immeasurably to the prosperity of Britain’s 
empire.10 
Less than a century after Gandhi identified British Indians to be settlers and 
pioneers, the Asian settler has reentered the historical record for markedly 
different reasons and in a distinctly (post)colonial political terrain.11 In Indians 
 
3. 19 GANDHI, supra note 1, at 186. 
4. Id. 





10. Id. at 187. 
11. Bonita Lawrence & Enakshi Dua, Decolonizing AntiRacism, 32 SOC. JUST. 120, 134–35 
(2005). For a response to Lawrence and Dua see Nandita Sharma & Cynthia Wright, Decolonizing 
Resistance, Challenging Colonial States, 35 SOC. JUST. 120, 120–21 (2008). Much of this resurgent and 
renewed interest in Asian settlers has focused not on British Indians, but on Chinese and Japanese 
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Abroad, Gandhi’s characterization of British Indians as settlers offered one way to 
emphasize the material significance of Indian labor and its vital role in building the 
British Empire. At the same time, his essay invited a resounding call for Indian 
nationalism and a potent anticolonial critique. Contemporary accounts of the 
Asian settler, by contrast, have been motivated by divergent political and 
economic stakes which carry significantly different effects. As activists and 
scholars in the current global context emphasize the urgent need to recognize 
indigenous sovereignties, to decolonize existing relations between indigenous 
peoples and settler states, and to pursue indigenous/nonindigenous reconciliation; 
as observers and commentators aim to make sense of changing geopolitics, 
particularly the rise of India and China and their growing involvement in resource 
development and trade in Africa; and as legal, social, and cultural historians chart 
the entangled genealogies of colonialism, the Asian settler has entered colonial 
history and postcolonial politics in unprecedented and also troubling ways.12 
In some instances, engagements with the Asian settler question have been 
highly productive, gesturing to the significance of Chinese, Japanese, and Indian 
migration in shaping colonial politics across continental divides; emphasizing the 
conjoined histories of indigenous peoples and non-European migrants in settler 
societies; and highlighting the structural links between distinct and seemingly 
incommensurable colonial projects, including indigenous dispossession, slavery, 
indenture, and “free” migration.13 Other accounts have been framed in 
surprisingly ahistorical terms. To claim that Asians are settlers comparable to or 
the same as Europeans, as some have done, glosses over the uneven, 
asymmetrical, and coercive conditions of colonial, juridical, and racial power that 
drew Gandhi’s attention and reproach in Indians Abroad and through which he 
 
migrants. Ann Curthoys, An Uneasy Conversation: The Multicultural and the Indigenous, in RACE, COLOUR 
AND IDENTITY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 21, 23–34 (John Docker & Gerhard Fischer 
eds., 2000); see also ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM: FROM LOCAL GOVERNANCE TO THE HABITS OF 
EVERYDAY LIFE IN HAWAIʻI passim (Candace Fujikane & Jonathan Y. Okamura eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM]. 
12. On India and Africa, see ANTOINETTE BURTON, BROWN OVER BLACK: RACE AND THE 
POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIAL CITATION 1–20 (2012). For an important essay that raises questions on 
the geopolitical rise of China and of settlers and natives in Africa, see Grant Farred, The Unsettler, 107 
S. ATLANTIC Q. 791, 791–95 (2008). For a recent discussion of reconciliation between indigenous 
peoples and immigrants of color in Canada, see CULTIVATING CANADA: RECONCILIATION 
THROUGH THE LENS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Ashok Mathur et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
CULTIVATING CANADA]. For discussions of indigenous and black sovereignty, see George Elliot 
Clarke, “Indigenous Blacks”: An Irreconcilable Identity?, in CULTIVATING CANADA, supra, at 397, 399–404. 
13. See Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents, in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE: GEOGRAPHIES OF 
INTIMACY IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 191, 191–208 (Ann Laura Stoler ed., 2006); RENISA 
MAWANI, COLONIAL PROXIMITIES: CROSSRACIAL ENCOUNTERS AND JURIDICAL TRUTHS IN 
BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1871–1921 (2009). Neither Lowe nor I discuss the Asian settler directly. 
However, each of us is interested in the role of the Chinese migrant in histories of European 
colonialization in the Caribbean and Canada respectively. 
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contrasted the European and the British Indian as settlers on divergent ethico-
political and economic grounds.14 
This Article situates the Asian settler debate within one historical context of 
settler colonialism. Beginning with Gandhi’s provocations that British Indians 
were settlers and pioneers, I place his anticolonial critique within a much longer 
and flourishing discourse on Indian settlers in early twentieth-century South 
Africa. During this period, as is now well known, British Indians in Natal, the 
Cape Colony, Transvaal, and Orange Free State, inspired by and often under the 
leadership of Gandhi, struggled against racially restrictive and coercive legislation, 
including mandatory registration, poll taxes, disenfranchisement, segregation 
ordinances, and proposed laws barring their entry and facilitating their 
deportation.15 In resisting the violence of anti-Indian legislation and the conditions 
of impermanence these laws generated, “free” British Indians often made claims 
as settlers, to emphasize the historical contributions of their labor, their 
indispensability, and their futurity in South Africa. In so doing, they sought to 
distinguish themselves from other racially inscribed and enumerated populations 
including Indian indentures, Asiatic migrants, and, most notably, native Africans. 
The juridical taxonomies in circulation—“native,” “European,” “Asiatic,” and 
“colored”—were manifestations of a wider regime of racial-colonial power aimed 
at constituting, dividing, and governing South Africa’s heterogeneous populace.16 
Crucially, as I suggest below, these juridical-racial taxonomies were also temporal 
divisions that fomented legal subjectivities ascribed with unequal degrees of worth 
and value, disparate rights to the land, and with distinct claims to the imperial 
polity.17 Each of these racial designations implied specific durations in and of time 
 
14. In Hawaiʻi, see Candace Fujikane, Introduction to ASIAN SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 
11, at 1, 4. In the Canadian context, see Lawrence & Dua, supra note 11, at 120, 134–35. 
15. There is now a vibrant literature on Indian exclusion in South Africa. One of the earliest 
and most cited remains Robert A. Huttenback, Indians in South Africa: 1860–1914: The British Imperial 
Philosophy on Trial, 81 ENG. HIST. REV. 273, 273–91 (1966). 
16. Informed by the work of Foucault, I conceptualize race as a regime of power that cannot 
be reduced to ideology, corporeality, or exclusion alone. Race is not simply imposed on institutional 
structures that govern social life (including law), but is deeply rooted in the generativity of power/ 
knowledge that informs the emergence and development of these institutional structures and their 
various effects, including violence and coercion. It is through the production of racial regimes of 
power that subjection and subjectification are made possible, occurring and unfolding as mutable and 
mobile forces, responding to various social relations and occurrences, and assuming different 
manifestations and meanings. These materializations are not always identifiable as “racial,” especially 
if race is narrowly conceived as corporeality, ideology, and/or exclusion. For a useful critique of race 
as ideology and corporeality that informs my thinking here, see Barnor Hesse, Im/Plausible Deniability: 
Racism’s Conceptual Double Bind, 10 SOC. IDENTITIES 9, 11–12 (2004), and Barnor Hesse, Racialized 
Modernity: An Analytics of White Mythologies, 30 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 643, 645 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hesse, Racialized Modernity]. See also DENISE FERREIRA DA SILVA, TOWARD A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE 
2–4 (2007). Here, da Silva explores how the racial has prefigured the production of philosophical, 
scientific, and humanistic thought. 
17. I began developing this argument of race, law, and temporality in an earlier article. Renisa 
Mawani, Specters of Indigeneity in British-Indian Migration, 1914, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 369, 369 (2012). 
For very useful discussions of time and subjectivity, see JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: 
HOW ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT 59–60 (2002). For a discussion of race, temporality, and 
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and thus differing degrees of political sovereignty. British Indians’ claims as 
settlers were asserted against the temporalizing forces of legality and were aimed at 
placing law’s time and its attendant racial inscriptions “out of joint.”18 
Law as temporality presents a set of questions and invites a formulation 
through which to critically examine the Indian settler as Asian settler question. 
Although time is crucial to the spectacular and quotidian expressions of law—to 
its force and legitimacy, and its onto-epistemology—in legal scholarship, law’s 
time has too often been assumed rather than problematized.19 Insofar as legal 
historians and legal theorists have discussed law’s time explicitly, the temporalities 
of law have often been restricted to history and context.20 This Article begins 
sketching a fuller account of law as temporality by examining how law produces, 
engages, and inscribes discontinuities between past, present, and future to fortify 
its own authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy. These processes, I contend, are 
especially evident in the racial subjection and subjectification of Indian settlers and 
in their appropriation and deployment of juridico-political identities. 
In what follows, I develop these intersecting themes of law, temporality, and 
colonial-racial subjectivity in two parts. In Part I, I begin to formulate an analytic 
approach to rethink law as temporality. Here, I contend that law’s times cannot be 
conceived solely in terms of history or historicity. Rather, the temporalities of law 
demand a critical engagement with law’s role in the production and organization 
of time as past, present, and future; law’s imposition of time on colonial-legal 
subjects; and the tensions and disjunctures between law’s time and lived time. Law 
as temporality, I suggest, opens ways to foreground not only the past and present 
as significant moments in law’s claims to authority and legitimacy, but the future 
as a juridico-political terrain that forges an equally critical tense of legality. 
To be sure, the times of law produce tensions and paradoxes that can most 
readily be identified in the material conditions of their emergence. Following 
Gandhi’s admonishments of British imperialism and his remarks on its uneven 
racial and political effects, Part II is situated in early twentieth-century South 
Africa. Focused on debates in Indian Opinion, the Natal newspaper initiated and 
 
subjectivity, see DA SILVA, supra note 16, at 115–51, and ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY 
1–18 (2001). 
18. The term “time out of joint” comes from WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5 
and is used by Derrida to discuss the role of the specter. JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: 
THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, & THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 3 (Peggy 
Kamuf trans., 1994). 
19. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1669, 1670 
(2010). For important and notable exceptions, see CAROLE J. GREENHOUSE, A MOMENT’S NOTICE: 
TIME POLITICS ACROSS CULTURES 175–210 (1996), or see PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND 
THE GROUNDS OF LAW 84–90 (2001). 
20. For a useful discussion of the relationship between law, history, and context in American 
legal history, see Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 
1790–1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587, 587–609 (2011). For an important discussion of time and the 
common law see KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 
1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011). For an account of time as duration see 
Renisa Mawani, The Times of Law, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2015). 
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edited by Gandhi, I point to the exigencies and urgencies of settler colonialism, 
the conditions in which British Indians self-identified as settlers, and the effects of 
these identifications on prevailing constellations of racial-colonial power. My 
discussion of the Indian settler in South Africa is not intended to place law in 
history or context. Rather, my account offers one historical opening through 
which to consider the doubling of time: the tensions between law’s creation of time, 
including the legal production of colonial-legal subjectivities, and the challenges 
posed by British Indians whose claims as settlers were animated by their own lived 
times of colonialism—including migration and indenture—and which animated 
their claims to belonging. Ultimately, the colonial legalities, temporalities, and 
politics that I elucidate here, I hope, might open new itineraries for legal history 
and for an (un)timely politics of solidarity currently occluded by contemporary 
claims that Asians are settlers.21 
I. THE TIMES OF LAW 
All our pasts are . . . futural in orientation. 
  —Dipesh Chakrabarty22 
Over the past two decades, law and legal studies have begun to take space 
seriously.23 However, they have not approached time with the same critical rigor. 
In legal scholarship, time is often assumed to exist as though it were a natural 
phenomenon, unfolding effortlessly and inconspicuously as the backdrop to social 
and political life.24 Even in legal history, where questions of temporality would 
seem to be of interest and concern, time has only recently been the subject of 
critical discussion and debate.25 Often, time is tacitly conceived as a sequential and 
directional line on which events, subjects, and objects may be plotted and 
organized in a chronological fashion. For Constantine Fasolt, historians do not 
often begin their investigations by questioning time. They presuppose it. History, 
 
21. On politics as untimely, see ELIZABETH GROSZ, IN THE NICK OF TIME: POLITICS, 
EVOLUTION, AND THE UNTIMELY (2004). See also DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING 
EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 74–75 (2000). 
22. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 21, at 250. 
23. There is a large and robust literature on legal geography. For early interventions in the 
field, see generally NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW SPACE AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 29–
31(1994) and THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE (Nicholas Blomley et 
al. eds., 2001). 
24. Writing about the literature on war, Mary Dudziak argues as follows: “Ideas about the 
temporality of war are embedded in American legal thought. A conception of time is assumed and not 
examined, as if time were a natural phenomenon with an essential nature, providing determined shape 
to human action and thought.” Dudziak, supra note 19, at 1670. Although Dudziak is writing of a 
specific context and a particular body of literature, one can easily expand her critique to encompass 
law and legal studies, a field in which time is central but not often or fully problematized. 
25. There is now a growing concern with temporality in legal history. PARKER, supra note 20; 
Dudziak, supra note 19, at 1672; Christopher Tomlins, Revolutionary Justice in Brecht, Conrad, and Blake, 
21 LAW & LITERATURE 185, 187 (2009) [hereinafter Tomlins, Revolutionary Justice]; Christopher 
Tomlins, The Threepenny Constitution (and the Question of Justice), 58 ALA. L. REV. 979, 984–86 (2007) 
[hereinafter Tomlins, Threepenny Constitution]. 
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he contends, “shelters us from the experience of time.”26 It “comforts us with the 
illusion that subjects can be defined by their historical conditions and that change 
over time can be explained by historical development.”27 Although legal historians 
have demonstrated that law unfolds in time, that it has a history and historicity, 
few have examined how law appeals to particular conceptions of time, whether 
linear, chronological, circular, or instrumental. Even fewer have asked how law 
produces time, how it orders the nomos through its own temporalities, aspiring to 
assimilate and absorb other temporalities in the process. By reducing time to the 
past and to context, legal historians have conceptualized temporality as a quality 
that is both vital and intrinsic to history but one that remains exterior and 
insignificant to law.28 
Yet, law is fundamentally about time. A cursory glance at legality in all of its 
heterogeneity and diversity—as statute, precedent, technique, administration, and 
command—yields numerous examples in which juridical concepts, legal 
discourses, and legal authority are underwritten by and draw their meanings from 
the production, specification, and arrangement of time. Civil and criminal 
statutes—most notably contracts, property, and sentences—are structured and 
organized along particular temporal coordinates. Law draws its meanings and 
gains its authorizing force through specifications and limits on time 
(minimum/maximum sentences or statute of limitations, for example) and 
through the temporalities it inhabits and brings into being.29 Although law may 
seem to operate through a historicist logic evident in its self-referentiality and in its 
structure of citation and repetition, law is not reducible to a single past. Rather, its 
pasts are often futural, to paraphrase Dipesh Chakrabarty above. Law’s pasts are 
teleological in orientation, reflecting both a continuity and a break with what came 
before, and often refracted through its promises for social betterment and 
progress in a future that is yet to be realized. 
As these few examples suggest, time is integral to the ontology and 
epistemology of law. It is equally significant to law’s organization of social and 
political life. The temporal forces of law are vividly materialized in national 
constitutions. As an act of originary violence, the founding law and social contract 
that juridically binds the people to the sovereign, the U.S. Constitution, 
demonstrates the composite and fluctuating relations between past, present, and 
future.30 As an inaugural legal imposition, the Constitution divides time into a 
“before” and “after.” Read and experienced in the present, it connects the polity 
through a series of absences, through memories and fragments of the past, and in 
 
26. CONSTANTINE FASOLT, THE LIMITS OF HISTORY 231 (2004). 
27. Id. at 231–32. 
28. SAMERA ESMEIR, JURIDICAL HUMANITY: A COLONIAL HISTORY 62 (2012). 
29. See Emmanuel Melissaris, The Chronology of the Legal, 50 MCGILL L.J. 839, 846 (2005). 
30. On the originary violence of the constitution, see Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The 
“Mystical Foundations of Authority,” in ACTS OF RELIGION 230 (Gil Anidjar ed., 2002). On the 
constitution and temporality, see Tomlins, Threepenny Constitution, supra note 25, at 992–93. 
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promises and proscriptions for an anticipated future that has yet to arrive.31 As a 
written text that sets out a national vision, the meanings and purpose of the 
Constitution are intended to exceed, extend, and outlive its authors. Figured in a 
moment of discontinuity and interruption, between the past and future of social 
and political life, the Constitution is not solely a product of or in time. Rather, it 
produces, condenses, and disjoins time while remaining explicitly teleological. It 
encourages the people to cultivate and expand their national solidarities by moving 
beyond the past, overcoming their individual differences, while striving to fulfill a 
more promising and just future.32 The Constitution produces its own set of 
temporal rhythms, effacing other temporalities—reducing “indigenous time” to a 
time before conquest, the nation, and history, for instance—and arranging the 
social body in its own visions of a selectively imagined past, present, and future.33 
Through its emphasis on historical progress, its presumed break from the past, 
and its embrace of futurity, the Constitution vividly reveals law’s production and 
organization of time.  
For feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz, time can only be understood as 
doubled. Time may present an irreversible continuity she writes, yet “the events in 
time each have a duration of their own, and thus function through discontinuity, 
realignment . . . [and] rupture.”34 Drawing primarily from the work of Henri 
Bergson and placing him in conversation with Darwin and Nietzsche, this 
doubling of time, Grosz explains, is produced by the tensions and frictions 
between the persistence of an overarching time on the one hand, and time as the 
duration and temporality of each event, thing, or process, on the other.35 Grosz 
conceives of overarching time as cosmological time. However, this doubling, I 
argue here, is also apparent in the temporalizing force of law, through the coarse 
and resistant encounters between an unfolding and overarching telos and the 
multiple and unforeseeable temporalities of specific subjects, objects, and events 
that continually exceed and escape legal order and arrangement, conditions to 
which law must respond.36 Law creates time as a discontinuity—through the fitful 
organization of a past, present, and future that underwrites statute and precedent. 
Yet, law is constantly confronted by legal events, subjects, and processes each with 
their own duration and each a potentially disruptive force that does not easily 
follow or abide by law’s temporal decrees. 
 
31. Peter Goodrich argues that the constitution is always oriented to the future. PETER 
GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC MASKS 172 (1990). 
32. Tomlins, Threepenny Constitution, supra note 25, at 993. Although Tomlins is discussing the 
U.S. Constitution, this memorializing of the past and reinvention of the future is also vividly evident 
in Iraq’s new constitution. See Renisa Mawani, Law’s Archive, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 337, 358–60 
(2012). 
33. On indigenous time, see Farred, supra note 12, at 798. 
34. GROSZ, supra note 21, at 250. 
35. Id. 
36. For a compelling account of the British common law as underpinned by a time that 
maintains a discontinuity with itself, see PARKER, supra note 20, at 15–16. For a Bergsonian reading 
of the common law see Mawani, supra note 20. 
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Conceptualizing law as temporality raises a series of important questions. 
How do law’s disjointed movements between past, present, and future, and its 
responsiveness to its own exteriority produce a doubling of time?37 On what 
terms are these temporalities constituted and organized and to what effect? In 
what ways does law aim to absorb other temporalities into its ever-extending telos? 
How does lived and experiential time escape, exceed, and reconfigure law’s 
temporalizing force? These are difficult questions that I can only begin to address 
here. To do so, I draw inspiration from two unrelated bodies of scholarship: 
critiques of Western imperial time and from the insights of Henri Bergson and his 
recent interlocutors, including Grosz.  
Admittedly, each of these literatures offers distinct and seemingly 
incommensurable interventions and engagements with temporality. In colonial 
and postcolonial studies, Western time as historical time has been the subject of a 
growing and sustained critique.38 Unlike legal historians and legal scholars, critics 
of colonialism have not approached time as history alone. Rather, many have 
viewed futurity to be a crucial terminus in the progressive and directional march of 
history. Colonial futures figured crucially as sites of governance, potential 
transformation, and, ultimately, annihilation. The future of the colonies was to be 
distinct from the past, a new time to be captured via observation and prediction 
and to be refashioned and improved through persuasion, coercion, and brute 
force. In the work of Bergson, by contrast, the future remains a creative and 
unpredictable opening that evades calculation and exceeds regulation.39 It is 
precisely these tensions between the future as a break from the past in terms of 
colonial legality and governmentality, and the future as a continuous site of 
creative opening that persistently escapes legal capture, that is of interest to me 
here. Despite Britain’s efforts to transform and reinvent the futures of its colonial 
subjects via the force of law, legality, and other violent and coercive modes of 
“advancement,” Bergson’s duration offers a useful reminder that colonial futures 
were often beyond juridical control. Thus, law’s production of an “overarching 
time,” to use Grosz’s phrase, differed significantly from and existed in tension 
 
37. On law as responsive, see FITZPATRICK, supra note 19, at 84–90. 
38. Postcolonial studies have had a long engagement with temporality, as I discuss below. 
There is now a growing concern with time in settler colonial studies and from a number of different 
disciplinary approaches. FABIAN, supra note 17, at 27–28; ELIZABETH A. POVINELLI, ECONOMIES 
OF ABANDONMENT: SOCIAL BELONGING AND ENDURANCE IN LATE LIBERALISM 36–37 (2011); 
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ESSAY ON THE DATA OF IMMEDIATE CONSCIOUSNESS 211–12 (F.L. Pogson trans., 1910). He 
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with the multiple durations of lived time that it sought to order and even eradicate. 
This doubling of time, between law’s time and the duration of lived time, fractured 
colonial legalities, opening sites for resistance and subversion, while also 
producing new intensities of colonial-legal violence, as I discuss more fully in the 
following section. 
In postcolonial studies, scholars have long critiqued time as a Western and 
secular modernity and as an ontological and organizing impetus of social and 
political life. As Anne McClintock observes, the field has, from its very inception, 
oriented itself against the “imperial idea of linear time.”40 Postcolonial historians 
and literary critics, in particular, have directed their intellectual labors towards 
decentering Europe from its presumed place as “the sovereign, theoretical subject 
of all histories” and experiences, including non-European ones.41 What Dipesh 
Chakrabarty has famously termed “provincializing Europe” invites a fundamental 
rethinking of historical time as a multiplicity of historical times. One cannot de-
center Europe and conceptualize plural histories of power, he contends, without 
“radically questioning the nature of historical time.”42 The authority of a universal, 
secular, and singular Western time, he and others insist, has underwritten global 
histories of capitalism, what counts as politics, as well as prevailing conceptions of 
the modern political subject. For Chakrabarty, the problem of historical time is 
not reducible to the past. History has always been entangled with futurity, he 
maintains. “Imaginations of socially just futures for humans,” continue to take 
“the idea of a single, homogenous, and secular time for granted.” Thus, 
questioning historical time requires a critical investigation into the effects of a 
singular and chronological time on both the past and the future.43 
Colonizing time was crucial to Britain’s acquisition and control over territory 
and to its modalities of colonial legality and governance. The imposition of a 
single, Western, and secular time has a dense and lengthy history of its own, 
unfolding over centuries, ushered in through the movements and expansion of 
Christianity via developments in classical physics and through advancements in 
technology, including the invention of the mechanical clock.44 By 1884, at the 
height of British imperialism, Britain distributed its own vision of time across the 
globe through the invention of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The creation and 
imposition of a global time enabled Britain and its European counterparts to 
divide the world into twenty-four time zones, standardizing and homogenizing 
time while beginning the erosion of other temporalities inspired by deities, gods, 
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42. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 21, at 15. 
43. Id. 
44. Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1631, 1634 (1989); see also ADAM BARROWS, THE COSMIC TIME OF EMPIRE: MODERN BRITAIN 
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and natural forces.45 The institutionalization of GMT as a global standard time 
was motivated by Britain’s national and imperial ambitions including military, 
scientific, and industrial advancements, as well as colonial expansion and control.46 
The governance of time became the ultimate expression of Enlightenment 
rationality, national/imperial authority, and supremacy, while opening new ways 
for the metropole to rule its colonies from afar and at a distance.47  
The imposition of a single, Western, secular, and overarching time held 
significant albeit uneven consequences for colonial subjects and populations. In 
India, for example, record-keeping practices introduced by the East India 
Company and expanded by the British crown, instantiated Western time as the 
legitimate temporal register. The use of calendric dates and chronological times in 
public life introduced new discourses of time while diminishing the significance of 
Hindu, Muslim, and other chronologies.48 These processes were expanded and 
institutionalized from the late nineteenth century onward as British rule 
restructured time through wage-labor, telegraph and railway timetables, and 
through new forms of punishment.49 British time became a critical foundation of 
British law in India. The daily, bureaucratic, and mundane operations of law and 
legality, through which Britain sought to maintain its grasp over the uncertainty 
and indeterminacy of colonial life-worlds, demanded the imposition and regulation 
of time. Courts sat on particular days and at specific times, legal events and 
procedures were recorded in letters, reports, and in correspondence following 
clock and calendric time and sent via telegraph lines that followed their own 
timetables. The introduction and inauguration of legal schedules, processes, and 
conventions instituted by the British, to facilitate their rule over India, repeated, 
reproduced, and reinforced the hegemony of Western chronological time, even if 
this time was frequently contested, rejected, ignored, and manipulated by the 
colonial subjects on whom it was imposed.50 
Conceptions of a homogenous, linear, and secular time were an integral 
aspect of the common law’s ontology in the empire.51 Representing both a 
 
45. BARROWS, supra note 44, at 50–51. 
46. See Peter Galison, Einstein’s Clocks: The Place of Time, 26 CRITICAL INQUIRY 355, 364–66 
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50. Western forms of temporality had a significant effect on Hindu law. With the reform of 
India’s judicial system in 1864, Bernard Cohn observes, legal decisions in English “transformed 
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continuity and break with the past, British law and legality substantiated and 
legitimized its authority through its promises for the future. Futurity, as 
Chakrabarty and others have noted, figured prominently in Britain’s rule over 
India. In 1833, Thomas Babington Macaulay made this point in his well-known 
speech to the House of Commons: 
The destinies of our Indian empire are covered with thick darkness. It is 
difficult to form any conjecture as to the fate reserved for a state which 
resembles no other in history, and which forms by itself a separate class 
of political phenomena. The laws which regulate its growth and its decay 
are still unknown to us. It may be that the public mind of India may 
expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good 
government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better 
government; that, having become instructed in European knowledge, 
they may, in some future age, demand European institutions.52  
Jurists and colonists, including Macaulay, who looked beyond Britain to its 
colonies, assumed that the expansion of British law to colonial jurisdictions and 
the transformation of indigenous forms of legality that it was believed to facilitate, 
would bring colonial subjects firmly into the progress and reason of modernity. 
Britain’s “gift of law” to India was underwritten by a historicist and 
developmentalist logic; assimilating India into an overarching time of British law 
would bring its ancient civilizations forward, from a dark and anachronistic past 
into an enlightened present and future, even if the exact terms and effects of law 
and legality remained in dispute and under negotiation.53 
Law’s creation and imposition of time is also clearly evident in histories of 
settler colonialism, and in displacements and dislocations that also radically altered 
other non-Western temporalities. The effects of law’s temporalizing force are 
perhaps most visible in the racial subjection and subjectification of indigenous 
peoples. In settler colonies, the future was often envisioned not solely through 
promises of social, political, and moral development and transformation but 
through annihilation, by relegating colonial subjects, especially indigenous peoples, 
to the past and to history.54 Law produced an overarching and chronological time 
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through which it sought to capture the lives and experiences of indigenous 
subjects and life-worlds into a singular temporality. Thus, the European 
resettlement of indigenous lands, I am suggesting here, generated a set of concerns 
that were mutually territorial and temporal. Unlike the Indian subcontinent, where 
British authorities endeavored to bring colonial subjects into modernity, in settler 
colonies, aboriginal peoples were largely, but not exclusively, confined to history.55 
Although these temporal logics emerged with the settler state, through repetition, 
re-creation, and reinstantiation, law as temporality has become a governing force 
through which chronologies and legal subjectivities have been produced through 
conceptions of Western time that are seemingly natural and naturalizing.56  
In the Canadian context, for example, John Borrows, an Anishnabe/Ojibway 
legal scholar, has compellingly argued that legal definitions of “aboriginality” have 
located indigenous peoples and aboriginal rights firmly in the past. Analyzing the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Van der Peet, where Canada’s highest 
court determined the nature and extent of aboriginal rights under section 35 of the 
Canadian constitution, Borrows contends that the court defined aboriginality in 
retrospective terms. Although the court agreed that aboriginal peoples resided in 
Canada before Europeans arrived, they defined aboriginal as “what was, ‘once upon 
a time,’ central to the survival of a community, not necessarily about what is 
central, significant and distinctive to these communities today,” Borrows points 
out.57 Defining aboriginality through the past and through history, the Supreme 
Court of Canada determined that aboriginal rights “protect only those customs 
which have continuity with practices existing before the arrival of Europeans.”58 
For Borrows, the Supreme Court’s decision may have recognized aboriginal rights 
but in so doing “froze” them in the past, with little prospect or significance for the 
future.59 
Critiques of time in colonial and postcolonial studies have highlighted the 
ontological and epistemological effects as well as the juridico-political stakes of 
European colonialism. Western conceptions of secular time, as some have argued, 
were not natural or inevitable forces but were strategies of rule that deferred the 
production of modern subjects into the future in some instances and locked them 
in the past in others.60 These critiques point to the fundamental ways in which 
European expansion took hold of the world by grasping and rearranging time. 
Importantly, as others have noted, the heterotemporalities that the British aimed to 
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repress often escaped and defied regulation.61 Writing of “empty homogenous 
time” as the time of capital, Partha Chatterjee reminds us that this formulation of 
time is an abstract time rather than a lived one. It is a time that “[p]eople can only 
imagine.”62 Despite Britain’s efforts to impose a chronological and calendric time 
onto its Indian subjects, Chatterjee contends that lived time under colonialism 
remained heterogeneous, dense, and uneven.63 It is here that the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson and his formulations of duration as lived and experiential time 
become useful. Notwithstanding Britain’s efforts to mechanize, quantify, and 
expand temporality through GMT, law and legality, and through various 
technologies including the mechanical clock and the timetable, the lived time of 
colonial subjects frequently escaped legal definition and regulation. In Van der Peet, 
indigenous peoples and aboriginal rights may have been relegated to Canada’s past 
and to its time “before history.” However, indigenous struggles over rights to land 
and resources continue to persist, are asserted through claims to futurity, and are 
animated by particular and ongoing lived relations to the land. In short, the dense 
experiences of lived time may be momentarily displaced but are never fully 
eclipsed by the imposition of law’s time. 
Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Henri Bergson 
was a steadfast critic of the ways in which modern science and philosophy 
engaged with questions of time. For Bergson, these discussions incorrectly 
reduced time to mathematical measurement and to spatial configurations. The 
“terms which designate time,” Bergson writes, “are borrowed from the language 
of space. When we evoke time, it is space which answers our call.”64 Physics, he 
claimed, could not conceive of time on its own terms. It “rests altogether on a 
substitution of time-length for time-invention.”65 Responding to what he 
perceived to be a rigid, mechanistic, and inaccurate formulation of time, Bergson 
proposed duration, as the “trajectory of a body in motion,” a time that is lived, 
experienced, concrete, and always changing.66 We must not accept the movements 
of time as characterized by science, Bergson urges.67 We must examine “the flow 
of time,” as “it is the very flux of the real that we should be trying to follow.”68 
Duration, for Bergson, is a continuous unfolding in which past, present, and 
future fundamentally coexist in a heterogeneous simultaneity. As such, duration, as 
he conceives it, is a force that escapes measurement and one that equally defies the 
constraints of language. Duration represents a continuous flow in which we pass 
insensibly from one state to another, “a continuity which is really lived, but 
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artificially decomposed for the greater convenience of customary knowledge.”69 
Because duration is doubled as both singular and multiple, “there is no one 
rhythm,” Bergson claims.70 Instead, the heterogeneity of duration renders the past, 
present, and future to be overlapping, interpenetrating, and continuous, 
preventing these times from being separated, ordered, prioritized, or arranged in 
succession or linearity. In Bergson’s formulation, the past can never be viewed as 
the primary or most significant dimension of temporality. Rather, the force of 
duration can only be experienced in the here and now.71 Bergson does not 
privilege the present over the past, however. The dynamic past, which is accessible 
through memory in the now, has an endless capacity to revive itself in the present 
and in an unknown and unpredictable future. The past, which is contracted and 
contained in each moment of the present, may be a precondition but is never the 
determination of futurity. The future may be animated by the past but it expands 
the present, remaining a radically discontinuous, uncertain, unpredictable, and 
creative opening.72 
Bergson never discussed law. Nor have his many interlocutors.73 However, 
his conception of duration as flow opens interesting possibilities for rethinking 
law as temporality and for developing the idea that time itself is doubled. Given 
that law is a modality of reasoning, judgment, meaning, and force that operates 
through language and representation, when read through Bergson, it cannot 
possibly grasp the lived experiences of duration. In John Borrows’s assessment, 
for example, law cannot make sense of the complex and discontinuous histories of 
aboriginal peoples and their relations to the natural world, including land. “Things 
and events happen at certain moments,” Bergson reminds us.74 As such, “the 
judgment which determines the occurrence of the thing or the event can only 
come after” it has already occurred.75 Law continually seeks to fix subjects and 
events in time through judgments, definitions, and impositions that are always 
retrospective. Life and experience continually exceed legality, shoring up the limits 
of law but often with violent effect, as Van der Peet reminds us. Although law seeks 
to draw the past and future into the present, the future remains undecided, as a 
site of novelty, unpredictability, and change. It is precisely this view of the future 
as uncontainable and unforeseeable that has led Bergson’s interlocutors to view it 
 
69. HENRI BERGSON, MATTER AND MEMORY 186 (Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott Palmer 
trans., Zone Books 1988) (1896). 
70. Id. at 207. 
71. SUZANNE GUERLAC, THINKING IN TIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO HENRI BERGSON 91 
(2006). 
72. GROSZ, supra note 21, at 184. For Bergson’s discussion of the future as “expanding the 
present,” refer to BERGSON, CREATIVE EVOLUTION, supra note 39, at 52. 
73. For notable exceptions, see ALEXANDRE LEFEBVRE, THE IMAGE OF LAW: DELEUZE, 
BERGSON, SPINOZA 114–17 (2008); Alexandre Lefebvre, The Time of Law: Evolution in Holmes and 
Bergson, in DELEUZE AND LAW 48 (Rosi Braidotti et al. eds., 2009); and Mawani, supra note 20. 
74. BERGSON, THE CREATIVE MIND, supra note 39, at 22. 
75. Id. 
           
80 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:65 
as a political terrain of possibility.76 It is also this view of the future as open and 
indeterminate that has rendered it an object of colonial law and legality.  
Combining critiques of Western imperial time with Bergson’s duration, as I 
have endeavored to begin here, points to a doubling of time through the tensions 
between law’s time and the multiplicity of lived times. To be sure, a linear and 
homogenous time underwrote legal and political developments in the British 
Empire. So too did its disorientation. Just as British time was aimed at ordering 
colonial life through its emphasis on progress and on the conjoined futurity of 
some colonial subjects (settlers) and the vanishing past of others (indigenous 
peoples), this temporal continuity was continually challenged by conceptions of 
lived and experiential times that often defied legal regulation. Law as temporality 
shaped social and political life, privileging certain tenses that mattered (i.e., 
futurity), obscuring its own involvement by naturalizing time, and yet remaining 
continually open to contestation. In early twentieth-century South Africa, as I 
argue below, histories of colonial-racism manifested in coercive legal 
developments were crucial to producing the “Indian settler” as a juridical-racial 
concept and as a temporalized legal subject who made proprietary claims to 
belonging through colonial futures of settlement. 
Thus far, my discussion of law as temporality has remained at the level of 
abstraction and generalization. The doubling of time, which I have been 
intimating here, produced tensions, inconsistencies, and excesses that can more 
clearly be elucidated through the material and political contexts to which it gave 
shape and in which it was produced. The discussion to follow takes us back to 
Gandhi and to early twentieth-century South Africa to examine how law generated 
temporalities through racial subjection and subjectification by inscribing colonial-
legal subjects in chronological time. The lived temporalities wrought by colonial 
and imperial expansion, including forced migration, indenture, diaspora, and 
exile—conditions that confronted British Indians in South Africa—were often 
mobilized to negotiate and undermine law’s time through the disjointed and 
discontinuous experiences of a colonial lived time.77  
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II. INDIAN SETTLERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
[T]here is a close relationship between subjectivity and temporality . . . in some way, 
one can envisage subjectivity itself as temporality 
  —Achille Mbembe78 
Written in 1919, five years following his return to India, Gandhi’s assertion 
that British Indians were settlers and pioneers had a much longer history in South 
Africa.79 As a political identity, the term settler was widely circulated across colonial 
contexts, deployed by Europeans as a racial and proprietary claim to civilizational 
superiority, territorial ownership, and to social and political entitlement and 
belonging.80 “Settlers were those who came from the ‘north’ . . . were generally 
considered free and were headed tautologically for settler colonies.”81 As a 
colonial formation, the settler was ontologically white.82 The term “settler” 
accrued its racial significance and value through assertions of racial being and 
belonging that were enacted, symbolically and materially, through coercive and 
violent relationships of conquest, manifest in the dispossession, subjugation, and 
eradication of indigenous peoples.83 Formulated through specific claims to 
temporality, the settler was thus distinct from the immigrant. European assertions 
of priorness, permanency, and racial supremacy entailed an insistence to social 
belonging that was contingent on origins that gained their racial and temporal 
meanings through the putative inferiority and primitiveness of a vanishing 
indigenous populace.84 As such, the term settler was already arranged in a 
hierarchical and competing order of occupancy and in a disjointed temporality.85 
In their demands to be first, European settlers inscribed their pasts into their 
futures. Indigenous peoples, by contrast, were situated in the past and, as Borrows 
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tells us, subjected to European time and partially effaced through the literal, 
symbolic, and territorial erasures this retrospection enabled.86  
From the turn-of-the-century onward, “free” British Indians in South Africa 
regularly appropriated and assumed a settler identity, albeit on their own terms 
and to achieve specific effects. Although the settler had a distinct racial ontology 
and was the alibi and outcome of European conquest, British Indians arrogated 
and adapted the term to emphasize their own genealogies, contributions, and 
perpetuity in South Africa; the settler afforded British Indians a powerful 
rhetorical strategy through which to foreground their investments in the colony’s 
past and in its future as a British settlement. Given that the term was already 
freighted with ontological and temporal entanglements that conjoined European 
and indigenous, British Indian appropriations were consistently locked in a 
specific constellation of racial-colonial power. Their claims to be settlers, as 
Gandhi’s essay makes clear, were underscored by their violent pasts and imagined 
futures in South Africa, their putative ethico-political differences from Europeans, 
and their presumed political and civilizational superiority over native Africans. The 
Indian settler, as I argue below, was marked by a double emergence. It was the 
dual effect of a virulent colonial-racism, most visibly evident in the 
implementation and institutionalization of racial-juridical prohibitions. It was also 
the outcome of anticolonial struggles and activism directed against colonial-
racism. Evoked as a ruptural figure, the Indian settler challenged some racial and 
temporal configurations of colonial power and reaffirmed and reinforced others. 
To fully understand its vexed conditions of production and possibility, and its 
racial and temporal signification and significance, necessitates a brief detour 
through South Africa’s long history of Indian migration, restriction, and exclusion.  
The legal restrictions and prohibitions directed at Indians in South Africa 
have a rich and well-documented history.87 Although Indian migration is often 
perceived to be a nineteenth-century phenomenon, Indians first arrived as slaves 
in the Dutch Cape during the mid-seventeenth century, brought by Dutch 
merchants returning from their travels to India. Large-scale migration from the 
Indian subcontinent did not begin until two centuries later. Many Indian migrants, 
including Gujaratis and Parsis from the northwestern and western regions of 
India, crossed the Indian Ocean to work as traders, hawkers, and professionals. 
However, the largest numbers of Indians were brought from Madras and Calcutta, 
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both located on the eastern coast, and recruited via systems of indenture.88 
Between 1856 and 1859, as Britain began developing its plans to cultivate sugar in 
Natal, it looked to India as a primary source of cheap and exploitable labor. From 
1860 to 1911, estimates suggest that over 150,000 Indian workers were 
successfully conscripted under programs of indenture.89 After completing their 
requisite terms of labor many were encouraged by colonial authorities to renew 
their contracts or to return home. Yet large numbers remained in South Africa. 
Between 1902 and 1913, only 32,506 Indians who arrived via indenture returned 
to India.90  
Driven by the uneven demands for cheap and exploitable labor and by new 
opportunities of economic trade and settlement, patterns of Indian migration to 
South Africa followed discrepant trajectories. Given its reliance on indentured 
labor, Natal had the longest history of Indian migration and was home to the 
largest resident British-Indian community. By the late nineteenth century, the 
numbers of Indians in Natal almost matched those of Europeans. According to 
the 1893 census, 500,000 Africans, 43,742 whites, and 41,208 Indians resided in 
Natal.91 By the late nineteenth century, there was a growing British-Indian 
populace in the Transvaal as well as smaller communities developing in the Cape 
Colony and Orange Free State.92 The settlement of British Indians and the 
reception and responses it engendered were shaped, influenced, and complicated 
by the distinct political status of these jurisdictions.93 Whereas Natal and the Cape 
were British colonies, the Transvaal and Orange Free State were Afrikaner 
Republics. In 1910, the four were consolidated as a union under British rule. 
Despite their historical, political, and jurisdictional differences, their respective 
governments viewed migration from India to be an urgent problem. Restrictive, 
coercive, and prohibitive legislation, especially in Natal and the Transvaal, was 
deemed necessary not to prevent Indian migration altogether but to discourage the 
permanent settlement of “free” Indians. “Never has a community been engaged in 
an unequal fight such as our countrymen are in South Africa,” Gandhi wrote in 
Indians Abroad.94 “Compared to their rivals they are poor. They have no political 
power and they have been engaged ever since 1880 in protecting the right to exist 
with self-respect a right which any civilized Government would not deny even to 
utter strangers.”95 It is from these conditions of racial exclusion and struggle that 
the Indian settler emerged. As an effect of racial, colonial, and juridical power, the 
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settler was a political identity, appropriated from its histories of European 
conquest, and mobilized by British Indians as a modality of anticolonial critique 
that drew on the past and reached out to the future as a refusal to be temporary. 
There is little doubt that the restrictive and prohibitory legislation passed in 
Natal and elsewhere in South Africa was aimed at dissuading permanent Indian 
settlement. In 1880, twenty years after the first indentures arrived—after 
thousands completed their requisite five-year terms, refused to renew their 
contracts, and newly claimed residence as “free” Indians—anti-Indian sentiments 
intensified and were institutionalized through a series of exclusionary and punitive 
laws and policies. Although Natal remained committed to maintaining its steady 
supply of indentured labor, authorities strongly discouraged Indian settlement by 
enacting legislation that placed limits on mobility, and access to housing, marriage, 
and education. Together, these laws were aimed at socially and politically 
disenfranchising ex-indentures, colonial-borns, and those newly arrived, curtailing 
the freedom of “free” Indians and limiting their long-term prospects for 
permanent settlement. In 1895, to draw one well-known example, all non-
indentured adult Indians in Natal were required to pay a three-pound annual tax, 
an imposition that would later become one target of Gandhi’s Satyagraha 
campaign.96 The following year, Natal disenfranchised all British Indians, except 
those already on voter’s lists. Importantly, this particular legislation never cited 
Indians directly. Rather, it stipulated that “those ‘who (not being of European 
Origin) are Natives or descendants in the male line of Natives of countries which 
have not hitherto possessed elective institutions,’ unless exempted by the 
Governor in Council,” were not permitted to vote in parliamentary elections.97 As 
India was ruled by Britain and thus did not enjoy elective institutions of 
government, the Natal Act was interpreted widely to include British Indians. For 
the purposes of the Act, migrants from India were defined as “natives,” a 
conflation that would become the subject of intense criticism and debate among 
British Indians well into the twentieth century. 
Historians and scholars of Indian migration to South Africa have usefully 
chronicled the emergence of anti-Indian legislation and the legal and political 
responses it evoked from various constituencies, including Gandhi.98 Immigration 
to South Africa, and to settler colonies more generally, has most often been 
conceptualized in spatial and geographical terms. Many have conceived of anti-
Indian laws through territorial containment and exclusion, for example. Writing of 
immigration restrictions as a global phenomenon in early twentieth-century 
settlement societies, Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds make this point cogently. 
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Prohibitory legislation aimed at restricting non-European migration, they observe, 
“became a version of racial segregation on an international scale.”99 While I am in 
no way disputing the territorial significance of immigration regulations, what I am 
suggesting here is that restrictive and prohibitory laws directed at British Indians 
and other non-European migrants in South Africa and elsewhere might also be 
read as a temporalizing force. Immigration restrictions did not limit Indian migration 
solely in spatial and territorial terms alone. They also restricted and prohibited 
migration through the imposition of an overarching time. The fitful times of a 
vanishing past, a temporary present, and a permanent future, were produced, 
imposed, and reinforced by legal enactments and taxonomies that ordered colonial 
subjects—including “natives,” “Indians,” and “Europeans”—in and through 
time. Making up People, I suggest below, was a juridico-political and temporal 
process that differentiated individuals and demarcated populations as racially 
distinct and as inhabiting competing and incommensurable times of colonial 
settlement.100 The proliferation of anti-Indian laws, it is important to remember, 
were not directed at indentured laborers who came to South Africa under coercive 
conditions of contract and with specified times of residence. Rather, prohibitory 
and restrictive legislation, including the three-pound tax and the ban on voting, 
was aimed at “free” Indians, inscribing them in a temporary now, foreclosing their 
demands to legal rights, and limiting their future prospects as permanent residents.  
In early twentieth-century South Africa, the temporalities of law were 
particularly visible in the concerted but unsuccessful efforts to racially taxonomize, 
order, and govern the region’s heterogeneous populace. Legislation in Natal, the 
Transvaal, and elsewhere produced a set of political and legal subjects identified as 
“European,” “native,” “colored,” and “Asiatic,” each with (and without) 
corresponding rights, duties, and privileges and with different temporal terms of 
settlement. To be sure, there was much at stake in the social, political, and legal 
distinctions and differentiations between populations. However, racial-juridical 
definitions were never clearly determined. Racial classifications in colonial South 
Africa were often produced and circulated without explicit definition.101 Even 
after colonial-racial taxonomies were institutionalized, racial designations were 
inconsistently deployed and distinctions between populations, including “natives” 
and “Indians,” were frequently collapsed. Racial inscriptions were highly mutable 
and were open to lively discussion in courts, amongst government officials in 
South Africa and London, and in the public domain. After the 1910 union under 
British rule, racially specific laws increased in number and intensity. As Deborah 
Posel observes, there was “no general constitutional definition of racial categories, 
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which meant that each statute concerned with race produced its own rendition.”102 
This confusion and controversy over racial designations was especially apparent in 
deliberations over nativeness. “One of the first difficulties presented in connection 
with the consideration of laws by the recent South African Native Affairs 
Commission,” wrote one commentator in 1905, “was the varying definitions 
therein of the term ‘Native.’ So great indeed is the variation that in the same 
colony [of South Africa] it has several meanings.”103 At least one of these 
meanings included British Indians. 
Individuals and populations were racially differentiated through physical 
appearance, descent, civilization, comportment, language, and lifestyle. Juridical-
racial distinctions were also informed by temporal designations that did not always 
map neatly onto racial differentiations and were not as mutable or easily 
languished. Under the 1896 Natal Act, British Indians and the “natives of Africa” 
were considered similar on racial terms. Both populations were deemed inferior to 
Europeans, were thought to be in need of vigilant administration, and were to be 
excluded from social and political life, albeit in very different ways.104 Whereas 
colonial authorities frequently designated Indians and native Africans to be 
commensurate, though not identical, on the barometer of racial and civilizational 
inferiority, in other legislation they were registered in distinct and incommensurate 
temporalities. In 1907, the Transvaal Immigration Restriction Act No. 15 
differentiated immigrant and native populations in spatial and temporal terms, 
even if these distinctions were not defined or elaborated substantively.105 The Act 
drew a clear legal and political divide between the “aboriginal races of Africa” and 
those immigrants who sought entry into the Transvaal.106 Accordingly, a 
“prohibited immigrant” included a long list of classes “desiring to enter or 
entering this Colony.”107 By defining immigrants via entry and arrival, prohibited 
persons were explicitly identified as those who came from elsewhere. The Transvaal 
Immigration Restriction Act further emphasized its jurisdiction and constituency 
by specifying that immigration restrictions were not applicable to “descendants of 
the aboriginal races of Africa south of the Equator.”108 As the “natives of Africa” 
were already territorially present, they could not be considered immigrants. Under 
the Act, immigration restrictions could only be extended to indigenous peoples if 
they came under the six prohibited classes: criminals; prostitutes; “lunatic[s]”; 
those afflicted with leprosy or “infectious or contagious disease”; undesirables; 
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and/or those deemed dangerous to the “peace, order, and good government” of 
the colony.109 By intimating the “aboriginal races of [southern] Africa” to be a 
population that was already there,110 the Act designated indigenous peoples to be 
temporally and spatially distinct from immigrants. “Here” and “there” were not 
solely geographical designations but also temporal ones. Native Africans residing 
south of the equator were tacitly regarded as the original inhabitants of the land 
and thus could not be restricted entry or deported. However, they could be made 
foreign under exceptional circumstances of moral and/or physical corruption.111 
Indian migrants, by contrast, were legally regarded as temporary sojourners who 
could be prohibited from entering South Africa and compelled to leave even after 
their arrival. 
As in discussions of immigration, space has figured centrally in debates over 
indigeneity and European resettlement in settler contexts. Indigenous sovereignty 
movements have gained traction through claims to the soil. Immigrants, by 
contrast, have long been conceived as those who arrived from a distinct place of 
origin and thus have a place of return.112 The “native,” “settler,” and “Asiatic,” 
critics have observed, have always been mapped in spatial terms, legally dividing 
and segregating settler contexts in efforts to prevent interracial intimacies and 
encounters.113 These racial taxonomies, as I suggest here, were also juridico-
political differentiations in time that generated conflicts and antinomies that 
demand further attention. Natives and European settlers each made competing 
claims as the prior inhabitants with disparate and uneven access to firstness. 
However, migrants were thought to arrive much later. Given these temporal 
demarcations, many British Indians recognized that they could not easily make 
demands for inclusion through claims to the past and to history.  
In efforts to secure a future in South Africa, British Indians might have made 
strategic appropriations as indigenous/native subjects; a population that migrated 
from elsewhere, labored on the land, enjoyed a long history of settlement in the 
region, and now saw themselves to be indigenous to the settlement colony. In 
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claims to inclusion precisely on such grounds.114 In South Africa, by contrast, 
Indians vehemently expressed their differences from native Africans in political, 
legal, and racial terms. Gandhi’s newspaper, Indian Opinion, was a vibrant forum 
for such debate, a site where “free” Indians—mostly business owners, politicians, 
and professionals—along with political figures in India and the diaspora voiced 
their views on political matters, particularly Indian exclusion. The result was a 
lively “diasporic public” in which contributors publicized and criticized legislative 
changes in South and East Africa and condemned the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.115 Many used this forum to 
publicly question, rebuke, and undo the racial taxonomies and temporal 
designations imposed on British Indians. They frequently challenged the 
temporalizing forces of law through duration, through their lived times of 
indenture, migration, and settlement. 
To be sure, British Indians were astutely aware of the temporalities that 
underwrote their exclusion in South Africa. Attending a meeting in Johannesburg 
where Indians were responding to the Asiatic Convention and denouncing 
proposals for Indian segregation, Dr. Williamson Godfrey—an associate of 
Gandhi—admonished the ongoing legal and political efforts to identify Asiatics 
with indigenous Africans. Very often, “the term ‘colored person’ is applied to 
mean natives and Asiatics in the popular language,” he lamented.116 However, 
[T]he history of the Colony shows that a sharp distinction has ever been 
drawn between the two. We have nothing in common. There are 
different laws regulating the connection of the natives with the other 
races living in Africa. . . . There is, for instance, a separate native tax. . . . 
The laws in which the distinction has been carefully observed are too 
numerous to mention. The latest is the Chinese Ordinance. This 
ordinance, recognising the distinction between the two races, provides 
for the Chinese labour on a totally different footing from the natives, for 
instance, the latter are invited to stay in the country, whereas the former, as soon as 
they have finished their indentures, are to leave the country.117 
To facilitate the ongoing and permanent residence of native Africans, 
Godfrey continued, colonial authorities set aside “huge reserves of land.”118 Yet, 
“there is no such thing” for Chinese and Indians, he observed.119 Although British 
Indians were well aware that native Africans were subjected to an intensifying 
racial-colonial legality aimed at securing their territorial dispossession and 
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segregation, they equally recognized that native populations were situated in a very 
different temporality and thus had distinct claims to belonging. Unlike British 
Indians, native Africans were rendered to be from the past and from the soil, a 
population with which the British were forced to contend, a population that held 
claims to prior occupation, and a population that required alternative means of 
containment, removal, and erasure. 
By the early twentieth century, distinctions between Indians and Africans 
generated considerable attention in the British Indian imagination. In 1906 for 
instance, Indian Opinion reprinted an article, What is a Native?120 Originally 
published in the East London Daily News, a newspaper that furnished the Cape 
Colony, the article pointedly questioned the racial-legal meanings of the term 
native, particularly its political implications for Indians and other non-British 
Asiatics: 
There has been a good deal of controversy as to the proper definition of 
the word native, and the question has, we see, been raised in the House 
of Commons [London], where Mr. Winston Churchill recently, in reply 
to an enquiry, said he believed the meaning attached to the word in South 
Africa was a native of any country other than a European country. 
Considering that Mr. Churchill has been out in this country [South 
Africa], and knows something about it, it is extraordinary that he should 
make such a blunder. We venture to say that the great majority of 
Colonists attach no such meaning to the word. To them a native is one of 
the aboriginal inhabitants of South Africa. Who ever speaks of Indians, 
Chinese or Japanese as natives?121 
British Indians claimed that native Africans, as the prior occupants, had a 
long history in South Africa and were indigenous to the land. As such, their own 
claims to inclusion mobilized the native African as a racially and temporally 
distinct figure. While some agreed that migrants from India arrived much later to 
lands that were already inhabited by native Africans, others viewed themselves to 
be much further ahead in their civilizational and political development. In their 
claims to be settlers, British Indians emphasized their long histories in South 
Africa, their futural investments in the development of the land through their 
forced labor, their business and professional acumen, and especially their racial 
superiority over the “aboriginal races of Africa.” 
The Indian settler emerged from the material conditions of racial coercion, 
hostility, and violence that underwrote European/white superiority and 
settlement. British-Indian claims as settlers opened a modality of anticolonial 
critique through which migrants from India rejected their impermanence, a 
temporality that was produced and facilitated through juridical taxonomies and 
through restrictive and prohibitory legislation. Their demands to be recognized as 
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settlers—with a past and a future in the colony—were temporal assertions of a 
lived time against the imposition of law’s time. In another 1919 essay, this one 
published in Indian Opinion, Gandhi foregrounded the duration of British Indians 
by emphasizing their long histories of indenture and settlement, and their politico-
economic contributions through their claims to the future:  
Indians have settled in South Africa for over 50 years; they are not 
known to have lowered the standard of living. . . . [T]he first Indian 
settlers were imported by the Europeans of South Africa[.] . . . I refer to 
the introduction of indentured Indians. I said in 1894, as I repeat now, 
that it was a criminal blunder on the part of the greedy Europeans of 
Natal to have imported indentured labour from India at miserably low 
wages when they had 400,000 stalwart Zulus in their midst who would 
gladly have worked if the employers had not wanted to make enormous 
profits. Can South Africa with any right on its side starve the descendants 
of the original settlers and their brethren out of existence?122 
Here, Gandhi identified all Indians to be the descendants and brethren of the 
original settlers who were brought by Europeans to labor in the region and who 
now claimed legal and political entitlements to permanently reside. This was a 
common argument. In the early twentieth century, many British Indians insisted 
that their efforts to cultivate the land as indentured laborers in the past afforded 
them some permanency in the present and future. “Before 1859,” Mr. Madanjit 
explained, “Natal was on the brink of bankruptcy. There were no tea or sugar 
estates, and her hotels and private houses could not find reliable cooks and 
waiters.”123 “The Kaffirs,” a pejorative term used to describe indigenous people, 
“could not be induced to work for any length of time.”124 Thus, “Indian labour is 
the fulcrum of the prosperity of Natal.”125 Recall to be a settler was not to be from 
the past alone. It was also a claim to futurity. “Colonial-borns,” Gandhi urged, were 
the future.126 They “were the permanent Indian settlers of South Africa.”127 The 
country “was their birth-place and home.”128 It was their responsibility to “nurse 
the [Indian] settlement” and to “live down the prejudice which . . . still existed in 
South Africa,” all in the interests of cultivating a better future.129 
British-Indian demands for permanent settlement, as I have argued above, 
were intended to challenge the temporalizing force of law. Their claims to 
belonging gained rhetorical traction through their assertions as both the past and 
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future of South Africa. Given the racial and onto-epistemological entanglements 
between settler and native, the aspirations of British Indians to be recognized as 
settlers were advanced through their self-acclaimed racial superiority over native 
Africans. Writing of mid-twentieth-century South Africa, Antoinette Burton 
argues that a “self-consciously racialized Indian settler identity” that developed in 
the 1940s was “dependent—in economic, political and imaginative terms—on the 
literal and figurative work of the indigenous African.”130 As the British-Indian 
appropriation of the settler suggests, the significance of native Africans in the 
making of an Indian identity has a much longer colonial history. To facilitate their 
own assertions of racial superiority and their related demands for permanent 
political and legal inclusion in South Africa, British Indians regularly identified and 
emphasized their putative civilizational differences with native Africans.131 
Indians, some observers claimed, enjoyed freedoms in India that were not yet 
afforded to the natives of South Africa: “We have perfect freedom of trade, of 
locomotion, of ownership of landed property, (indeed even the franchise such as 
it is), not so the natives of South Africa.”132 Others alleged that any legal and 
political comparisons drawn between Indians and native South Africans were 
made solely for the purposes of racial degradation. As one observer reported, 
Lord Curzon denounced the ways “in which Indians [in South Africa] are classed 
with barbarous races.”133 Similarly, the Colored People’s Vigilance Committee 
insisted that “Indian settlers are not ‘natives,’” they “are civilised men, who ought 
not to be confounded with raw Kaffirs.”134 
British-Indian demands to futurity through the idioms of settlement in South 
Africa, I am suggesting here, were intended as challenges to the temporalizing 
force of law. Importantly, their claims to belonging gained traction not only 
through duration or lived time but also through assertions of racial superiority 
over indigenous inhabitants. How are we to make sense of the racially freighted 
temporal claims of Indian settlers without reverting to facile explanations of 
Indian racism and without equating Indians with European colonists? As I have 
argued elsewhere, British-Indian claims as British subjects—as imperial citizens 
and as settlers—were the productive effects of a dynamic and mobile racial regime 
of power.135 European conquest and expansion generated new racial knowledges, 
including juridical-political processes that instituted, established, and calcified 
colonial-racial differentiations between Europeans and non-Europeans. The settler 
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was one outcome. These colonial distinctions were established in ontological 
terms via language, history, culture, disposition, religion, phenotype, and 
climate.136 Importantly, British Indians were not situated beyond or outside racial-
colonial power. They were its constitutive effects. As Foucault reminds us, there is 
a double meaning to the term subject. The subject may be “subject to someone else 
by control and dependence.”137 However, he is also “tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge.”138 Both instances, Foucault elaborates, “suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.”139 Subjection and 
subjectivity, I am claiming here, are inscribed in and work through competing 
racial temporalities. 
Racial power as white/European superiority worked on the body as 
coercion, violence, and force, as the enactment of colonial laws and through the 
subjection and subjectification of Africans and British Indians, as my discussion of 
South Africa makes clear. However, racial power also worked through subjects, 
through the production of desires, choices, and actions. Explaining the settler’s 
emergence solely through Indian racism tells us little of racial subjection and 
subjectification as entangled products of racial, colonial, and juridical power. 
Indian claims as settlers were not merely demands to be European. Remember, in 
Indians Abroad, Gandhi drew a clear and immutable distinction between the ethical 
priorities and objectives of British Indians and European colonists. Thus, British-
Indian assertions and appropriations of the term settler were temporal and racial 
claims to imperial subjecthood; they were demands for inclusion in the imperial 
polity to enjoy equal rights as British subjects through their pasts and their futures 
in South Africa as they were condensed in the now. Focusing on the generativity 
of race—as a regime of power that underwrote the colonial context in South 
Africa—foregrounds the Indian settler as a racial and temporal effect, a refusal of 
law’s time through the experiences of lived time that was produced through long 
and violent histories of colonial-racism. The temporal demands of the Indian 
settler were made possible through the antinomies of colonial politics and through 
the figurative and literal erasure of the African native as inhabiting a vanishing 
time of priorness. The constituent relations between subjectivity and temporality 
and the ontological entanglements between European and native, as evidenced in 
the term settler, reveal the asymmetries of colonial power that underwrote British-
Indian claims to belonging. 
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CONCLUSION 
[ T]he settler is a figure of contradiction rather than uninterrupted colonial hegemony. 
Some of the critical aporetic difficulties, those gaps, silences, ambivalences that so 
indelibly mark the colonial project, are resonantly evident in the settler. 
  —Grant Farred140 
What is to be gained conceptually and politically by critically examining the 
temporalities of law as teleological, yet fitful, as changing and responsive, as a 
process of doubling that continually unfolds onto and into itself? How might 
these abstract formulations on the ephemerality of law’s time be relevant to and 
resonate with the historical and ongoing politics of setter colonialism, the 
conditions that marked the emergence of the Indian settler in South Africa and its 
renewed counterpart, the Asian settler in Hawaiʻi, Canada and Australia? 
Conceptualizing law as temporality, through a wider and more dynamic view of 
past, present, and future, as I have suggested above, illuminates law’s claims to 
authority, legitimacy, and universality. It highlights law’s becoming: its expansive 
reach, its ubiquity, and in the case of South Africa and other settler colonies, its 
effects on the colonial-racial constitution and organization of social and political 
life. Conceptualizing law as temporality queries the ways in which law produces 
time, orders the nomos, and gains its authority through variegated and 
discontinuous temporal arrangements. While retaining the past as a critical 
element in law’s time, law as temporality moves beyond history and historicity and 
invites an exploration into law’s own deployment of time as a means of capturing 
and obscuring, albeit not always successfully, the densities of lived time. Law 
condenses past, present, and future, its telos produces an overarching unity in and 
as its nomos, a configuration in which the future is central as both a critical opening 
of newness and as a time to be appropriated and absorbed. One way through 
which law maintains its sovereignty and authority is by ordering the world 
temporally, erasing other temporalities through its overarching time, while 
remaining responsive to those temporalities that do not neatly map onto and 
cannot easily be incorporated into its own movements. The presumed 
timelessness of law masks a heterogeneity of lived temporalities that law aspires to 
assimilate and obfuscate but which also actively challenge and refuse law’s 
temporal claims, as the case of Indian settlers makes clear. Until law’s time is 
sufficiently problematized, the temporalities that continue to organize and animate 
racial-colonial distributions of power will remain eclipsed and unremarked. 
In early twentieth-century South Africa, a critical exploration of law’s time 
reveals the racial divisions and antinomies produced by colonial legalities, the 
fraught and fractious racial and anticolonial politics these divisions generated, and 
their ongoing effects as modalities of racial-colonial governance. Attending to law 
as temporality points to the dense, knotted, and shifting entanglements of settler 
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colonialism and to the existence of competing and overlapping temporalities. 
These antagonisms are not unique or specific to South Africa alone, as evidenced 
by indigenous struggles over land and sovereignty, changing state concerns over 
migration, and shifting geopolitics that have led to fears regarding the ascendency 
of China and India and its effects. In the midst of a projected “Asian century,” 
where Asia is considered the new future, the enduring, mutable, and lived forms of 
coloniality continue to demand historical analysis and critical scrutiny.141  
Charges of Asian settlers that have emerged of late must be situated within 
these historical, contemporary, and futural times as a way to consider the 
animating forces, logics, and modalities of violence that underpin its ascendency 
on the global political scene. The Indian settler, as I have argued here, cannot be 
separated from the violence and coercion of its emergence. As an effect of racial-
colonial power in early twentieth-century South Africa, the Indian settler vividly 
demonstrates the doubling of time: the ways that law produced colonial subjects 
as inhabiting specific temporalities (as past, present, and future) and how colonial 
subjects contested these temporalizations through their own fractured and 
dislocated conceptions of lived time. British Indians rejected the impermanence 
imposed on them through legal restrictions and taxonomies, and in so doing 
initiated their own conceptions of time that trafficked in particular formulations of 
race. Their claims as settlers endeavored to challenge some configurations of 
colonial-racial power but only by reinforcing, repeating, and reifying others. 
British-Indian attempts to challenge law’s time, particularly its imposing force, 
only reinscribed efforts by the colonial state to relegate native Africans to the past 
and to history. 
To look historically at the Indian settler question is not to absolve British 
Indians for their role in settler colonialism. Nor is it to initiate a comparison of 
colonial pain and suffering. Rather, my investigation, I hope, opens other ways of 
examining the enduring effects of racial-colonial regimes of power, particularly the 
deep entanglements of settler colonial violence and coercion that have resurfaced 
in (post)colonial politics, often in divisive ways. Approaching law as a temporal 
force in colonial politics foregrounds the racial divisions and antinomies produced 
through colonialism while suggesting that the racial is not solely a spatial force but 
also a temporal one that operates as an equally powerful set of governing 
practices. A critical examination of law’s temporalizing command, its divisions and 
dislocations might open possibilities for an (un)timely politics of solidarity that is 
currently strained through claims of Asians as settlers. The settler as Grant Farred 
reminds us, is a figure of contradiction produced by the silences and ambivalences 
“that so indelibly mark the colonial project.”142 It is these silences and 
 
141. While the nineteenth century was defined as the “British century,” and the twentieth 
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ambivalences, often marked and masked by the imposition of law’s time that 
demands our critical attention; as a way of problematizing the endurance of settler 
colonial politics in all its mutabilities. Following Bergson, it is a means of 
imagining futures as creative openings of ceaseless change that are always 
something other than what they appear to be today. 
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